‘expressions corner’ Launches in Tyr!

‘expressions corner’ was launched today for the first time within a Kazamaza studio which took place in Tyr. 7 wonderful 18+ participants took part in ‘expressions corner’ and absolutely loved the experience and opportunity to voice their opinions on issues that they live through every day without giving them a second thought. In ‘expressions corner’ they had cards that represented things they love, things they hate, things they don’t know about, and things they’ve never even thought about; lying side by side with equal importance. When asked for feedback, participants expressed: “No one ever asks about what we think or the ideas that we have about all these things.” According to Tonnie Choueiri who did a great job managing and facilitating ‘expressions corner’, participants were fighting over who should go next! The last participant shared with us this lovely feedback:

“If there hadn’t been ‘expressions corner’, this would have been a normal day, but now it has been a special one. I was the last one to go into ‘expressions corner’, so I could have missed it, but God wanted me to have the experience, so I got the chance, even though the workshop had already ended.”

I am happy that such a new method introduced to such a new audience, yielded such a successful outcome! Let’s hope that in the future, this method will prove successful with different audiences in different Lebanese regions as well…

‘expressions corner’ Ready to Roll

‘expressions corner’ was designed and developed as a new method for insight gathering that is highly confidential. It draws on the structure of interviews, but re-designs them to focus on providing an exciting and unusual experience for participants, in contrast to only aiming to capture information from them. Furthermore, unlike interviews, it allows participants to say as much or as little as they like, and it empowers them to control the order of the issues they want to talk about. How this is done is covered in the ‘Red and black cards’ section below.

Overview

‘expressions corner’ is my second fieldwork method and it was informed by the findings that surfaced from my first fieldwork method ‘explorations’. Some of these findings were that participants defined their identities through the following criteria: Geographic region, politics, religion, language, culture and nationalism. So the aim of ‘expressions corner’ is to gather more in-depth answers about these criteria, without any stigma, judgment, offense or subjectivity towards participants, in addition to engaging the target audience in idea generation of potential initiatives that can overcome these dividing lines.

‘expressions corner’ is designed to run alongside existing social workshops, camps, or other activities around Lebanon, that bring together youth ranging from 18 to 30 years old. ‘expressions corner’ will be set up in a corner of the workshop space, in a nearby room, or outdoor, depending on venue and availability.

Structure

Introduction and consent forms:

The facilitator introduces ‘expressions corner’ to all the participants as a group, and distributes consent forms that clearly explain and guarantee the confidentiality procedures of this activity. Participants are assigned reference numbers, and are invited one by one, in numerical order, to visit ‘expressions corner’ for a 30-minute experience. This experience involves the participant sitting inside a tent containing: A cushion, a headset, and 2 sets of cards. The headset is connected to a laptop and WISE wireless internet device situated outside the tent. The participant is asked to wear the headset. Through a Skype call, I explain to the participant the cards task in front of him/her. All the conversations will be recorded, however the participants will never see me or I see them (as I am in a completely different geographical location altogether), so their identity remains unidentifiable. Similarly, the ‘expressions corner’ facilitator who sets up the space, invites participants and runs the activity, will never enter the tent and listen to the conversations.

Red and black cards:

The participant is faced with 2 sets of cards: A red set with a question mark on the box, and black set with an asterisk sign. The red set contains numbered cards (1 to 46) that question the participants about their identity and perceptions towards others’ identities, and the black set (47 to 52) questions them about their reflections, opinions, experiences, and invites them to come up with ideas that encourage social integration and coexistence. The participant is first asked to pick up the red box, take the cards out, and shuffle them with their eyes closed. They then pick up the first card on top of the deck, tell me the number and talk about it for up to 30 seconds… just the first things that comes to their mind. When through, they put it away and repeat the same with the following card. This is a very quick process, and a participant needs to respond to cards as quickly as possible. I can also stop them and ask them further questions about a specific card. A participant may also choose to postpone up to 3 cards if he/she does not wish to speak about them straight away. They can place them on the bottom of the deck, but once they reach them again they will have to talk about them.

When the red cards are exhausted, the participant is asked to pick up the black box and speak about the black cards but his time without shuffling them as the cards take them through a self-reflection journey warming them up for the last card which is idea-generation.

Discussion guide cards:

These cards are only for my use. They contain the same images and words as the red and black cards, and are laid out in front of me in numerical order, to offer a guide of questions on the back. These help me prompt participants with additional questions about the cards they’re picking up if they are not being responsive enough.

Cues and notes form:

When a participant tells me the number on their card, I quickly write the recording time on the Cues and Notes Form and write any important notes next to the number. This will help me find cues in the audio files later when analysing responses.

Facilitator’s briefing pack:

This pack provides all the information a facilitator needs to know, to run ‘expressions corner’, including the agenda, emergency backup plans (where the internet and/or computer is down), and useful contacts for technical or strategical support. So far, 2 excellent facilitators, Tonnie Choueiri and Maya Jizzini, with previous experience in social work, have been trained through this pack and more could be trained if the ‘expressions corner’ schedules do not suit their availabilities at any point.

Next steps

The ‘expressions corner’ team is now ready and willing to integrate expressions corner in scenarios that bring together a relatively large gathering of young people between the ages of 18 and 30, in different regions around Lebanon. Suggestions and invitations for where and when to run ‘expressions corner’ is most welcome from any interested NGOs or other organisations, youth centres, community groups, educational institutions… Please contact joanna@therefordesign.net.

Thank you to the team at .: there for design … for producing all the resources and equipment of ‘expressions corner’ in such a short turnaround, and supporting this initiative as a whole!

Analysing ‘Explorations’

Introduction

‘Explorations’ is a fieldwork method that was completed in Lebanon in July 2009. The aim of ‘Explorations’ was to scope out initial empirical insight into the barriers of social integration in Lebanon, in relation to those stated by Safia Saadeh: Socio-political rigidity, geographical segregation, emphasis on differences rather than similarities, social institutions and social mobility (1992 pp. 76-94). Because the literature behind these barriers is slightly dated, ‘Explorations’ used a series of cultural probes and indirect, open-ended questionnaire-style enquiries to explore whether current behaviours, perceptions and opinions of young adults in Lebanon reflect these barriers. An additional barrier, selective mass media, was also explored, because hypothetically, this barrier may not have been as evident in the 1990s as it is today, to be highlighted in Saadeh’s research.

‘Explorations’ engaged a small sample of 18 participants that qualitatively represented dominant social groups in Lebanon. The sample is evidently not representative quantitatively as ‘Explorations’ is only an initial scoping exercise. The 18 participants live in six dispersed districts that reflect both homogeneous and heterogeneous sectarian compositions:

Beirut – Participants 01, 02, 03, 04, 05

Zahleh – Participants 06, 07, 08, 09, 10

Shouf – Participants 11, 12

Nabatiyeh –  Participants 13, 14

Tripoli – Participants 15, 16

Keserwan – Participants 17, 18

A briefing meeting was held with one key participant from each district. They were given ‘Explorations’ kits. During the meeting, the different ‘Explorations’ tasks were explained, and key participants were asked to recruit one or more participants from their district who they felt had slightly different behaviours and perceptions from their own. Participants were given one to two weeks to complete ‘Explorations’, and then a concluding meeting was scheduled with the key participants to collect the completed ‘Explorations’ and enquire about any ambiguous responses. You can see all the contents of the ‘Explorations’ kits in detail here.

Responses to 18 ‘Explorations’ kits yielded over 1080 unique pieces of information in handwritten, hand-drawn, photographic and audio forms. These were transcribed within an interactive matrix to facilitate analysis. You can see and read about the matrix here.

The following analysis will define each barrier to social integration, and discuss in detail whether this barrier has surfaced throughout ‘Explorations’ responses. The analysis will also attempt a preliminary psychographic and demographic segmentation although this remains entirely hypothetical due to the non-quantitatively-representative sample of participants.

Barrier: Socio-political rigidity

Since the Independence in 1943, Article 95 of the Lebanese constitution gave social groups hierarchical supremacy in the government depending on the size of their communities. Thus, people became entrenched in their social groups and are continuously attempting to increase their numbers. This has created an ongoing competition among different social groups to advance in power at the expense of the others, thus breeding discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 76-79).

Throughout ‘Explorations’ this sense of competition was mostly revealed in the ‘Opinion’ cards, when participants were asked to respond in one word, to the word ‘majority’. Participants acknowledged that the majority ‘rules’ (03), it is ‘important’ (12), controls the ‘power’ (01, 05) and allows a ‘revolution’ (09). Some responses denigrated the presumed ‘majority’ by stating that it is a mere ‘minority’ (13, 14), it is an illusion (07) and it ‘has no meaning’ (11). Participant 08 even wished the majority an ironic ‘good luck’. A few participants held a more impartial opinion expressing that the majority fluctuates, it is ‘unstable’ (15) and ‘relative’ (16).

Participants 01, 08, 16

Rivalry in the proportional representation of social groups in the government is more popularly referred to in Lebanon as sectarianism. When this word was introduced on the ‘Opinion’ cards, it became evident that it had both positive and negative connotations although it had been identified by Saadeh as a stimulator of socio-political rigidity.

Positive connotations attributed sectarianism with a sense of ‘diversity’ (01), something that was ‘essential’ (12) as an identify for ‘Lebanon’ (08). It was also attached to spiritual convictions such as ‘belief’ (13), ‘religion’ (02) and ‘virtue’ (14). These participants did not separate between the spiritual implications of religious sects and their political implications on society. To participants who embraced sectarianism, secularism – the potential of extracting sectarian representation within the government – was a ‘disaster’ (13, 14) or a ‘lie’ (12).

Participant 14

Some negative connotations clearly linked sectarianism with social segregation referring to it as ‘separation’ (06), ‘the lesion of society’ (07), ‘… conflict’ (17) or the reason behind ‘the Lebanese war’ (18). Other negative connotations were not as noticeably linked to segregation, but did describe it as a ‘problem’ (05, 17), a ‘disease’ (09, 11), an ‘inevitable evil’ (16) ‘corruption’ (03), and something that should be ‘refused’ (04). Those participants embraced secularism. They saw it as a ‘good’ (11), ‘wise’ (05), and ‘logical’ (06) ‘solution’ (10). It can be a ‘road to development’ (17, 04), ‘knowledge’ (01), ‘openness’ (02), ‘civilisation’ (18) and ‘freedom’ (07), and holds the opportunity to ‘unite people’ (15), hence overcoming social segregation. In his Journal, participant 09 states that his fear is that…

“Lebanon is controlled by fascism and sectarianism.” (09)

… and his dream is that…

“Lebanon has a secular government that preserves the rights of all its citizens equally.” (09)

Participants 04, 09

Despite the fact that some participants had secular aspirations, they still displayed a sense of dislike towards other social groups. This was apparent when they were asked to photograph five things they didn’t like. Participants 07 and 09 both photographed a billboard of Samir Geagea, the leader of the Lebanese Forces. Furthermore, some participants who encouraged secularism still expressed insecurity towards the continuity of their social group such as participant 07 whose fear was ‘the end of the Free Patriotic Movement’, or participant 15 who saw in sectarianism ‘fear and instability’.

Barrier: Geographical segregation

Saadeh explains that the Civil War restructured an unofficial physical geographical segregation in such a way that every major social group now dominates at least one area: The Druze in the Shouf, the Shiites in the Bekaa and South Lebanon, the Sunnis in Tripoli and Sidon and parts of North Lebanon, and the Maronites in Metn, Keserwan and parts of North Lebanon. The population in the capital city Beirut is divided into Christians in East Beirut, Sunnis in most of West Beirut, and Shiites in South and some of West Beirut. Three decades of geographical segregation led to the upbringing of young individuals isolated from their counterparts in other social groups. They were brought up to, at best ignore, and at worse denigrate, the ‘other side’. This has led to fear, apprehension and distrust between young people of different social groups, thus deepening the lines of segregation (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 79-81).

‘Explorations’ visibly illustrated this geographical segregation in the daily, yearly and long-term geographical mobility of participants. Distance is rarely a barrier to geographical mobility in Lebanon. It is a small country and crossing its entire length does not require longer than a three to four hour drive.

In the ‘Journal’, participants were asked to map the routes they have traveled during their day. Participants from Beirut (01, 02, 03, 04, 05) rarely left the city during their day. Their home, work and entertainment venues were all based in Beirut. All except one participant from Zahleh also restricted their daily travel within Zahleh. The excepted participant (07) works in Beirut but visits his home in Zahleh on the weekends and engages in voluntary work there. One of the participants from Shouf also remained in the same district (12) while the other participant (11) lives in Shouf and works in Beirut. The two participants from Nabatiyeh (13, 14) traveled either within Nabatiyeh, or other predominantly Shiite regions in South of Lebanon during their day. One of the participants from Tripoli (16) also remained within Tripoli and the second participant (15), a Greek Orthodox Christian, lives in Tripoli and works in Jounieh. Participants from Keserwan (17, 18) traveled within Keserwan and Metn, both mostly Christian district.

Participant 01, 07, 16

When asked to mark on the map five regions participants have visited in Lebanon during the past year, the responses showed a much more diverse mobility. This difference in day-to-day and yearly travels suggests that participants venture into other districts on day trips or short holidays rather than as part of their routine life. However, the majority of participants visited more districts where their sect was more predominant, and less or no districts where it wasn’t. For example, participant 16, a Greek Orthodox Christian from Tripoli visited Batroun, Bsharri, Jbeil, Koura and Zahleh. Most of these districts have high Christian populations. Participant 13 is a Shia Muslim from Nabatiyeh. He/She visited Aley, Jbeil, Metn, Tyr and West Beqaa. All these districts with the exception of Metn have Shia Muslim populations. Two participants had responses that stood out at different polarities. Participant 12, a Druze from Shouf had only visited Beirut and the Shouf within a year, while participant 14, a Shia from Nabatiyeh had visited 18 districts due to the nature of her social activism career.

Participants 13, 12, 14

To identify long-term geographical mobility, participants were asked to locate their home, school, university, work, and entertainment locations. This again identified that most participants have lived, studied and worked in one or two districts throughout their life, such as participant 08 who has always been based in Zahleh, and similarly with participant 13 in Nabatiyeh, 16 in Tripoli, and 05 in Beirut. Generally a second or third district is recognized as a ‘fun place’, therefore confirming that participants travel into other districts for short-term entertainment rather than settling down.

Participants 06, 16, 05

Barrier: Emphasis on differences rather than similarities

According to Saadeh, each social group adopted a peculiar lifestyle through fashion, values, language and dialect, to set them apart as an identifiable community. Elements of the Lebanese cultural identify were very homogeneous, so social groups looked outside Lebanon for cultural identities of nations they paralleled their religious beliefs to. Thus Sunnis associated with Saudi Arabia, Shiites with Iran, and Christians with the West. As a result, youth groups acquired in their upbringing, skills that allowed them to identify and judge members of other social groups by their physical appearance, their dialects or their interests (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 81-84).

In terms of aspirations towards other countries, participants were asked to colour in their top 5 countries in the world. It was clear that participants from Beirut irrespective of sect (01, 02, 03) and almost all Christian participants from different districts chose countries in the West such as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and other European countries (Italy, Spain, France…), in addition to popular or exotic holiday destinations such as Hawaii, Brazil, the Caribbean Islands and Japan. The Shia Muslim (13, 14) and Druze (11, 12) participants integrated Arab, Middle Eastern and/or North African countries within their selection such as Egypt, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen and Turkey.

Participants 01, 12

The perceptible identification signs that ‘Explorations’ revealed were religious, political, linguistic, and cultural. For example, participants 01, 10 and 12 had prayer or religion at the top of their priorities in their journals. Participant 11 wrote in his/her ‘Journal’ that he/she feared God, and participant 12 that he/she feared burning in hell. Participant 16 drew a cross as a symbol that means something for him/her, and participants 07, 09, 11, 12 and 14 all took photos of religious objects such as an iconographic image of Jesus, the Holy Bible or the Holy Quran, as things that they liked. Signs depicting political identity were less common. Participant 07 for example drew the logo of the Free Patriotic Movement as a symbol that means something for him/her.

Participants 07, 09, 11, 12, 14

Religious, political and cultural signs also surfaced in how participants define themselves in relation to others. In the ‘Friends’ network drawings participants described what they had in common or different with their friends, using terms such as ‘culture’ (01), ‘Free Patriotic Movement’ (09), ‘politics’ (10, 11, 12), ‘religion’ (10, 11, 12, 17) and ‘active in the church’s youth group’ (15).

Participants 11, 17

The ability, or as Saadeh states, the ‘skill’ of social groups to classify other social groups from their physical appearance was revealed in the ‘glimpse’ exercise where participants were asked to imagine a profile fitting of the person portrayed on each postcard. The portraits depicted either obvious, discreet or no social group identification signs.

For example, profiles regarding the portrait of the woman in the Sunni Muslim veil mentioned religion frequently:

“Dreamer, religious, contemporary.” (06) – “A girl who is committed religiously…” (07) – “A girl committed religiously, looking upwards, full of conviction and solid principles…” (10) – “She represents the image of a woman who is veiled in a Sunni veil.” (12)

Similar responses were written about the woman in a Druze veil:

“… Amiable, obliging and a believer.” (01) – “Religious, satisfied and happy.” (06) – “A girl committed religiously, living a life full of joy and happiness.” (10)– “The photo represents in my opinion, a woman veiled in a Druze veil.” (12)

An unexpected observation emerged from the postcards depicting veiled women. A number of participants expressed feelings of pity or sympathy towards these women. They attributed the veil to an inhibitor of dreams, aspirations, or as an element enforced rather than chosen by them:

“The veil was not her choice. She aspires to be more than that, to be free.” (02) – “She is governed by the traditions around her but she aspires for better.” (16) – “She is a woman who has been through a lot…” (02) – “This woman seems to have suffered a lot…” (04) – “This person looks like someone who has had a lot of difficulties in her life…” (05)

The veil was an apparent religious sign in the previous postcards. However, even the subliminal signs within other postcards were identified. For example the portrait below depicts a man with a tattoo of the cross and crown of thorns on his arm. Some participants recognized this and attributed it to fascism, in relation to an ongoing trend in Lebanon for Christian individuals to distinguish themselves through props depicting religious icons:

“A contemporary young man who follows trends…’ (09) – “His tattoo might give the impression of being fascist, but religion doesn’t have much spiritual importance for him.” (10) – “A person who is fascist about his religion.” (18) – “… Full of complications.” (06) – “Name: George…” (a Christian name) (16)

In the postcards that didn’t depict any religious signs, the participants seemed to focus more on professional achievements, personality traits or hobbies rather than social group classification:

“Actor. He studied in an art academy and specialised in production.” (01) – “He is a student continuing his studies and specialisation. He seems educated but doesn’t seem to pay much attention to outer appearance.” (10) – “A university student.” (12) – “Ambitious” (14) – “Name: Ralph, Age: 24, He works in computer programming. He loves spending time in pubs and clubbing. He doesn’t complicate things.” (15) – “Intellectual, sensible, a bit dum, upper class.” (17)

And finally, as an exception in the ‘glimpse’ exercise, participant 08 refused to complete this task by stating that ‘this is illogical for me because I can’t give a moral and psychological identity based on physical criteria’, he does nevertheless admit that ‘if I do so, I’ll be so Lebanese!’ thus confirming the popular conception that Lebanese make judgments based on appearance.

The last identification criteria that transpired is the use of language in different social groups, either in the spoken or written form. ‘Explorations’ were tri-lingual: Arabic, English and French, and participants had the freedom of responding in whatever language or language combination they wish. Lebanese are educated in 3 languages, with Arabic being a first language, and English and French second or third languages depending on the educational institution. So their choice of language is not solely based on their literacy rate, it is more importantly based on a social group identification method. Inclinations towards the use of Arabic reflect embracing the Arab culture, and preservation of identity. Inclinations towards English and French are attributed to Western aspirations, social class and/or higher education. For example, participants from Beirut (01, 02, 03, 04, 05), regardless of their religious sect, responded only in English and French, they did not use Arabic at all. Participants from Zahleh, Tripoli and Jounieh (06, 07, 08, 09, 10, 15, 16, 17, 18) responded in a mixture of Arabic, French and English, but Arabic was definitely dominant. Druze and Shia Muslim participants from Shouf and Nabatiyeh respectively  (11, 12, 13, 14) responded almost entirely in Arabic. There was no language distinction between writing and speaking. All participants recorded the 10 second incident message using the same language or language combination they had used when responding to the other tasks in writing.

Despite all these religious, political, cultural and linguistic division lines between social groups, ‘Explorations’ revealed a strong message of national allegiance and patriotism, even in the participants who had Western aspirations. ‘The World’ task underlined that most participants chose Lebanon as one of the top countries. Participants 07 and 13 drew in their journals the Cedar Tree – a national icon featured on the Lebanese flag – as a symbol that means something for them. In addition, many participants responded to the word ‘nationality’ on the opinion cards with words such as ‘identify’ (01, 03), ‘belonging’ (05, 08), and Lebanese (07, 09). Participant 10 interestingly commented that nationality is ‘the connection’, i.e. the common link between different social groups.

Participants 07, 13

Barrier: Social institutions

In Saadeh’s opinion, a number of social institutions further the continuation of disparate social groups.

First is the Judiciary System, divided into state laws (such as voting and business laws) that are set and controlled by the government, and exclusive personal status laws (such as criminology and inheritance) for each sect. Every social group must adhere to the personal status laws placed by the religious agency that represents it. Therefore, Bkirki, supported by the Maronite Council, is the reference point for Maronite laws, Majlis al-Millah for Greek Orthodox, Dar al-Ifta for Sunni, Al Majlis al-Shii al-Aala for Shia, and Shaykh al-Aql for Druze. The absence of a common civil law for all has increased inequality and division among social groups. A simple example is family members of different religions being unable to inherit from one another because different personal status laws would apply for each religion (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 85-88).

Responses in ‘Explorations’ did not seem to address the specific barrier of the Judiciary System. Participant 10 does mention in his journal that his dream is to ‘be a judge who is not affiliated to any political party whatsoever’ (10), but this can be influenced by the fact that he has studied law and so is aware of segregated sectarian policies within the Judiciary System. During the concluding meetings, it became apparent that participants had lack of knowledge regarding the relationship between religious agencies and laws, and many had the misconception that the civil court controlled all the laws.

The second institution is marriage. It is closely regulated because it can jeapordise the very existence of social groups if inter-community marriages and births are not supervised. On religious grounds, a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying into another religious group, but a Christian woman is not. Furthermore, children follow the religious sect of their fathers. These two factors resulted in an increase in Muslim populations and decrease in Christian populations, giving the latter group an incentive to promote social controls and pressures that deter youth groups from marrying into other social groups, and encourage endogamy (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 88-89). From 1952 to the present, the Lawyer’s Syndicate has requested numerously that civil marriage be initiated, but religious agencies have refused continuously (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 86).

When asked about the word ‘civil marriage’ in the ‘Opinion’ cards, participants had mixed responses. Some positive responses correlated it to ‘love’ in the sense that love has no religion and should be made possible between any two people (04,05). Others saw in it a ‘solution’ (16) to social segregation and responded with words such as ‘alliance’ (01), ‘remedy’ (07), ‘with’ (08), ‘the dream’ (10) and ‘useful but not sufficient’ (15). Some supported it for its practicality in ‘court’ or in ‘facilitating divorce’ rather than role in social integration. There wasn’t a clear social group segmentation in the positive responses, although all the participants from Beirut, regardless of sect were supportive of civil marriage, and most of the Christian participants from other regions were supportive as well, but some of the participants from Zahleh seemed less enthusiastic than others.

Participants 04, 17, 16

A clearer segmentation surfaced with Druze and Shia Muslims in Shouf and Nabatiyeh respectively. They regarded civil marriage as a ‘failure’ (11), or a ‘mistake’ (14), and as something ‘dangerous’ (12) that can lead to ‘victims’ (13). These were generally the same participants who had opposed secularism and embraced sectarianism. For the Druze sect, this sense of rejection may be prompted by their quick population decrease over the past centuries. This social group had autonomy and power during the Ottoman Empire, but today represents less than 10% of the population. As a result, rejecting civil marriage can help prevent it from dissolving within other social groups. The Shia Muslim sect on the other hand may be triggered by a completely polar incentive. During the Ottoman Empire and throughout the pre-Civil War period, this social group was a minority, and was regarded lower class with little autonomy. Over the years, this social group has increased in numbers drastically, to become now almost equal to or maybe even slightly higher than – in both population and governmental power – the Sunni Muslim sect. The successful strategy of increasing numbers for power ascertains that civil marriage may jeopardize this newly acquired status.

Participants 14, 11, 12

Unpredictably, none of the participants mentioned religion as one of the top 3 criteria for their lifetime partners; not even those who opposed civil marriage. Some hypotheses for this may be that it is presupposed that this criteria is met before any of the others are evaluated, or that participants are conscious of the discriminatory social implications of prioritising a person through the criteria of religion.

The third institution that limits social integration is the educational system, which is separated into the private and public sectors. Before the civil war, the government that ran the public sector encouraged the mingling of students and staff of different social groups within the same institution, but from as early as 1976, public institutions started quickly dividing into branches representing the religious affiliation of the local area. In addition, the public sector is notorious for its lack of organisation and low standards, and this has driven many parents who can afford it, to resort to the private sector for the education of their children. Religious institutions mainly run this sector, and open their doors to students within the same affiliation with minor exceptions. In these private institutions, the content and cultural aspects of the teachings are driven along religious ideologies (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 90-91). As a consequence, both the public and private educational sectors today offer very limited opportunities in schools and universities for youth of different social groups to study in a diverse environment.

In ‘Explorations’, participants were asked to reveal the schools and universities they had attended in the past. Some participants chose to write the region where the school or university was situated rather than the name. And in those cases, these were almost always located within the same region as their permanent home.

For those participants who recorded the names of schools, the large majority had attended religiously affiliated schools such as ‘Evangelical School’ (06) and ‘Ecole Saint Elie’ (10). It was interesting to see that the two Shia Muslim participants (13, 14) from Nabatiyeh had attended a Christian school, ‘Notre Dame Antonine Sisters High School’. These same participants had rejected civil marriage despite the fact that they might have been surrounded by Christian pupils throughout their childhood.

University responses seemed less religious. The majority was either public or international affiliated universities such as the ‘American University of Science and Technology’ (06), the ‘Lebanese American University’ (14), and the ‘Lebanese University Faculty of Law’ (10) (a public institution). It is anticipated that for most of these participants, university was the first time they met counterparts from other social groups, so at the age of 18.

Participants 10, 06

Barrier: Social mobility

In general terms, Saadeh refers to this as the movement of individuals from one social group to another. If this movement occurs at the same level, it contributes largely to social integration. However, in Lebanon, it is only possible on an upward or downward level according to two strict conditions: The first is the upper or lower movement of the social group as a whole, and the second is the upper or lower movement of the individual within his/her own social group. Attempts that met the first condition in the past led to two civil wars, in 1958 and 1975, both guided by the Sunnis as they tried to move upwards towards the Maronite group. Attempts that met the second condition led to further segregation between members of the same social groups as they tried to unseat the feudal families and overtake supremacy of the social group. The most violent of these attempts was the devastating war in 1989 between Michel Aoun’s army and the Lebanese Forces. The consequence was a division that is still existent today in the Christian social groups. Safia Saadeh states that ambitious youths who seek to further their status beyond the social mobility restrictions in Lebanon find immigration as the only outlet (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 91-94).

From ‘Explorations’, it seemed that participants were conscious of their inability to move upwards within their social status, but none of them attributed it to social mobility barriers. Saadeh identified this barrier through long-term observation of social group dynamics over a number of decades, so it may not be easily recognisable to individuals who have not gone through the same rigorous research process. Most participants did however express high aspirations when discussing their dreams in the ‘Journal’, such as ‘success’ (18), ‘to achieve’ (01), ‘to open up my own restaurant and be the chef’ (02), to ‘… leave a trace of my existence’ (04), to ‘be the manager of a stock exchange business’ (06), and to ‘get a PhD degree’ (12). These participants feared ‘unemployment’ (06) and failure (10, 15, 18) most of all. Many participants had words such as ‘knowledge’ (11), ‘studies’ (06), ‘career’ (16), and ‘work’ (02, 18) as their first priority in the ‘Journal’.

Participants 01, 12

Other participants linked the social status stagnancy, to the ‘war’ (14). To these participants, ‘freedom’ (04) and ‘living in peace’ (14) were priorities. They dreamed that ‘Lebanon becomes a unified country…’ (07), and that ‘… one day all wars will stop along with starvation and human rights will be respected’ (15). On the ‘Opinion’ cards, almost all participants responded to ‘peace’ with longing and hope, and to ‘war’ with rejection, hatred and fear, except participant 16 who wrote that war was the ‘last resort’.

Participants 01, 17, 06

Participant 09 wrote that the consequence of war was emigration. Saadeh considered emigration to be the only outlet for youth’s ambitions and aspirations. Some participants ‘wished for it’ (08), saw it as ‘definite’ (13, 14), the ‘solution’ (06), the ‘remedy’ (12), ‘essential’ (12), and a way for ‘looking for hope elsewhere’ (17). Others, although aware of its consequences, did not seem to object to it: ‘Brain drain’ (03), ‘sadness’ (04), tiresome’ (07), ‘difficult situation’ (10), and ‘despair’ (18). Two participants rejected it because it is a ‘disaster’ (11) and a ‘sword with two sharp ends’ (16).

Participants 03, 10, 04

Barrier: Mass media selection

This barrier sprung from a hypothetical observation that each social group in Lebanon owned, managed or moderated its own broadcasting channel, newspaper, and/or website portal. As a result, young adults from different social groups might be consciously or unconsciously filtering their media reception accordingly, and consequently remaining uninformed of news updates related to other social groups, or alternatively receiving partial news updates.

Two segmentation routes seemed to emerge when participants were asked about their favourite media. Participants seemed to consume the media that communicates in the same language they have used to respond to ‘Explorations’. So for example, those who replied in French read L’orient Le Jour’ newspaper, and their favourite book was French as well. Those who responded in English wrote that Brad Pitt and Coldplay were their favourite artists. Arabic respondents chose Arabic speaking artists such as Najwa Karam, and Adel Imam. The second segmentation route was social group consumption, and this was very evident in the choice of television channel and newspaper. Druze participants 11 and 12 chose Annahar and Future. Both are owned and managed by right wing political leaders (Hariri and Tueni) who are currently allied with the Druze leader Jumblat. Shia Muslim participants chose New TV, again a television channel managed by a Shia leader (Berri). Greek Orthodox participant 15 chose LBC, a television channel allied with a Christian leader (Geagea). Other participants from Beirut, Jounieh and Zahleh chose International instead of local media as their favourites, such as the Movie Channel, Discovery and TF1.

Participants 02, 13

Conclusion

To conclude, ‘Explorations’ revealed tangible evidence of Saadeh’s barriers to social integration, but some barriers seemed more pronounced than others such as geographical segregation and focus on differences rather than similarities. All barriers are a result of a complicated interaction between nominal and gradual parameters whose combination creates different social groups within the Lebanese social structure. Although ‘Explorations’ did not directly question the social structure parameters of participants – Religion, politics and geography – these surfaced naturally in participants’ responses. Alongside these, some additional parameters, that were not given particular focus in Saadeh’s literature, proved very significant – Language, culture and nationalism. This conclusion will summarise the analysis of ‘Explorations’ by focusing on each parameter individually.

Rates of religious (red) / political (brown) / geographic (green) / linguistic (blue) / cultural (violet) and national (grey) references in 'Explorations' responses

Religion

Religion was definitely a significant parameter. Responses that made religious references came from participants of all regions, but were significantly lower in Beirut and Jounieh, Keserwan (both urban regions), and higher in other regions, particularly Shouf with the Druze participants, a minority social group.

Politics

Political references were less pronounced than religious references, and had less significance than Saadeh had suggested. This could be due to the fact that her literature was written in the 90s, shortly after the end of the civil war, when political conflict was at its peak. Political references were non-existent in the responses of participants from Beirut, and highest in those of Zahleh. The latter revealed a number of affiliations and repugnances towards specific political parties. On the other hand, there seemed to be a polarity of opinions regarding general political ideologies such as sectarianism, secularism and civil marriage, with Druze and Shia participants from Shouf and Nabatiyeh being more conservative in their views than other social groups.

Geography

Geographical immobility was an evident and common parameter across different regions. The majority of participants have lived, studied and worked in one or two different districts only, and their visits to other districts are limited to entertainment purposes. Furthermore, these ‘entertainment’ districts are generally dominated by a sectarian presence that mirrors that of the participants.

Language

Saadeh discussed language within the barrier of focusing on differences rather than similarities. However, ‘Explorations’ revealed a major linguistic segmentation that it became vital as a separate parameter. As mentioned in the barriers, choice of language is rarely regulated by literacy as most Lebanese can speak Arabic, English and French in varying fluency levels. Nevertheless, participants from Beirut responded only in written and spoken French and English, while the majority of responses of participants from other regions were in Arabic.

Culture

Culture was again one of the aspects within the focus on differences rather than similarities, but came out as a distinct parameter. Participants from Beirut, Keserwan, and Tripoli, all urban areas, showed little if any interest in Arabic culture in terms of music, media, literature, and country preferences. Their responses were more directed towards Western aspirations. On the other hand, participants from Zahleh, Shouf and Nabatiyeh, all rural districts, highly favoured Arabic culture.

Nationalism

Nationalism seemed to be a linking rather than segregating parameter. Most participants demonstrated, in varying degrees, some sort of love, respect and loyalty to Lebanon. Participants from Zahleh showed the highest references to nationalism.

All in all it can be concluded that:

– Geographical immobility affects all participants.

– Participants from Beirut seemed to be little influenced by the segregation parameters of politics and religion, while participants from other areas were clearly more affected, and particularly in Zahleh, Shouf and Nabatiyeh.

– However, the linguistic and cultural polarity between Beirut and other regions creates an additional segregation line which raises the following question: Despite the relative religious and political objectivity that Beirutis have, will they be able/willing to integrate with participants from other regions who have almost opposing cultural and linguistic orientation?

The ethnographic fieldwork planned for summer 2010 will interrogate these findings in more depth, alongside further literature review.