Social Group Dynamics in Lebanon

The following literature review defines the social structure in Lebanon, outlines barriers to social integration, and proposes solutions for overcoming these barriers; all in relation to youth members of social groups.

In describing social groups in Lebanon, this research makes frequent referencing to Safia Antoun Saadeh’s book ‘The Social Structure of Lebanon’ (Saadeh, 1992) . Dar Annahar, a prominent publishing house in Beirut, reviewed the book as a rare piece of work. Although numerous books have been written about Lebanon in the past decades, very few were those that ‘dealt specifically and comprehensively with the social composition of Lebanon from a structural point of view.’ (Dar Annahar, 2008).

A Nominal Social Structure

Peter Blau distinguished two types of parameters in a social structure, the nominal and the graduated. The former divides the population into impermeable groups with no possibility of overlaps such as gender, religion or race, while the latter divides society into groups that may alter over time such as age, income or power. The correlation of both the nominal and graduated parameter leads to the ordinal parameter that forms the hierarchies of a social structure. (Saadeh, 1992 pp.19).

In Lebanon, the division of social groups is based on the nominal parameter of religious affiliation (Saadeh, 1992 pp.20).  The social groups incorporate three religions: Islam (including Druze), Christianity and Judaism, divided into 18 sects and dispersed in mixed and uniform towns and cities across Lebanon. Saadeh refers to these social groups as castes, because of their characteristic similarities.

The nominal social structure is reflected in the division of power in the government according to a consociational democratic system. Article 24 of the Lebanese Constitution states that The Chamber of Deputies should be elected on a confessional basis along three criteria: Equal representation between religions, proportional representation between sects and proportional representation between different geographic regions.  The Doha agreement  for the 2009 elections equally represented two religious groups, Christians and Muslims, proportionally divided into 11 sects (each forming at least one political party) and distributed along 25 districts. The total is 128 deputees who are considered official representatives of their respective social groups.

Barriers to Social Integration

Throughout history, the conflict between social groups in Lebanon witnessed everchanging solidarities and oppositions, many of which resulted in civil wars, the last ending in 1990. Today, although the conflict is mainly non-violent, Lebanese social groups are still noticeably isolated (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 74). Kamal Salibi writes that actual contact between different social groups is almost entirely restricted to political co-operation (Salibi, 1977 pp. xiv).  Mohammed El Machnouk reiterates this by comparing the social structure to the Baalbeck pillars with only the top part – the government – holding the pillars – the social groups – together (Machnouk, 2001 min. 9:45).  Saadeh examines the links between social groups further, by expanding on five features of the post-civil war social structure that have erected or accentuated barriers to social integration (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 76) . The features are expanded on below, and discussed in relation to their effect on youth integration:

1– Socio-political rigidity: The most influential social group altered throughout historical episodes: Druzes during the Ottoman rule (1516-1918), Maronite Christians during and after the French Mandate (1926-1975) and Sunni Muslims following the 15-year Civil War (1995-present) (Salibi, 1977 & Traboulsi, 2007). Since the Independence in 1943, Article 95 of the Lebanese constitution gave social groups hierarchical supremacy in the government depending on the size of their communities. Thus, people became entrenched in their social groups and are continuously attempting to increase their numbers. This has created an ongoing competition among different social groups to advance in power at the expense of the others, thus breeding discrimination in youth on the basis of religious affiliation (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 76-79).

2– Segregation: The Civil War restructured an unofficial physical geographical segregation in such a way that every major social group now dominates at least one area: The Druze in the Shouf, the Shiites in the Bekaa and South Lebanon, the Sunnis in Tripoli and Sidon and parts of North Lebanon, and the Maronites in Metn, Keserwan and parts of North Lebanon. The population in the capital city Beirut is divided into Christians in East Beirut, Sunnis in most of West Beirut, and Shiites in South and some of West Beirut. Three decades of geographical segregation led to the growth of young individuals isolated from their counterparts in other social groups. They were brought up to, at best ignore, and at worse denigrate, the ‘other side’. This has led to fear, apprehension and distrust between young people of different social groups, thus deepening the lines of segregation (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 79-81).

3– Emphasis on differences rather than similarities: To set themselves apart as an identifiable community, each social group adopted a peculiar lifestyle through fashion, values, language and dialect. Elements of the Lebanese cultural identify were very homogeneous, so social groups looked outside Lebanon for cultural identities of nations they paralleled their religious beliefs to. Thus Sunnis associated with Saudi Arabia, Shiites with Iran, and Christians with the West. As a result, youth groups acquired in their upbringing, skills that allowed them to identify and judge members of other social groups by their physical appearance, their dialects or their interests (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 81-84).

4– Social institutions: A number of these furthered the continuation of disparate social groups.

First is the Judiciary System, divided into state laws (such as voting and business laws) that are set and controlled by the government, and exclusive personal status laws (such as marriage and inheritance) for each sect. Every social group must adhere to the personal status laws placed by the religious agency that represents it. Therefore, Bkirki, supported by the Maronite Council, is the reference point for Maronite laws, Majlis al-Millah for Greek Orthodox, Dar al-Ifta for Sunni, Al Majlis al-Shii al-Aala for Shia, and Shaykh al-Aql for Druze. The absence of a common civil law for all has increased inequality and division among social groups. A simple example is family members of different religions being unable to inherit from one another because different personal status laws would apply for each religion (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 85-88).

The second institution is marriage. It is closely regulated because it can jeapordise the very existence of social groups if inter-community marriages and births are not supervised. On religious grounds, a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying into another religious group, but a Christian woman is not. Furthermore, children follow the religious sect of their fathers. These two factors resulted in an increase in Muslims and decrease in Christians, giving the latter group an incentive to promote social controls and pressures that deter youth groups from marrying into other social groups, and encourage endogamy (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 88-89). From 1952 to the present, the Lawyer’s syndicate has requested numerously that civil marriage be initiated, but religious agencies have refused continuously. (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 86).

The third institution that limits social integration is the educational system, which is separated into the private and public sectors. Before the civil war, the government that ran the public sector encouraged the mingling of students and staff of different social groups within the same institution, but from as ealry as 1976, public institutions started quickly dividing into branches representing the religious affiliation of the local area. In addition, the public sector is notorious for its lack of organization and low standards, and this has driven many parents who can afford it, to resort to the private sector for the education if their children. Religious institutions mainly run this sector, and open their doors to students within the same affiliation with minor exceptions. In these private institutions, the content and cultural aspects of the teachings are driven along religious ideologies (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 90-91). As a consequence, both the public and private educational sectors today offer very limited opportunities in schools and universities for youth of different social groups to study in a diverse environment.

5– Social mobility: In general terms, this refers to the movement of individuals from one social group to another. If this movement occurs at the same level, it contributes largely to social integration. However, in Lebanon, it is only possible on an upward or downward level according to two strict conditions: The first is the upper or lower movement of the social group as a whole, and the second is the upper or lower movement of the individual within his/her own social group. Attempts that met the first condition in the past led to two civil wars, in 1958 and 1975, both guided by the Sunnis as they tried to move upwards towards the Maronite group. Attempts that met the second condition led to further segregation between members of the same social groups as they tried to unseat the feudal families and overtake supremacy of the social group. The most violent of these attempts was the devastating war in 1989 between Michel Aoun’s army and the Lebanese Forces. The consequence was a division that is still existent today in the Maronite social group. Safia Saadeh states that ambitious youths who seek to further their status beyond the social mobility restrictions in Lebanon find immigration as the only outlet (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 91-94).

A Solution to Social Segregation

In her concluding chapter, Saadeh contemplates different solutions for integrating divided social groups. She discusses a number of different alternatives in the political system; from maintaining consociational democracy to shifting towards complete democracy, fundamentalism or secularism. She dissects every system and controverts it offering reasons as to why it wouldn’t solve the problem (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 117-124). These arguments will not be covered here because the subject of this research is not aiming to alter the political system.  However, what this research is concerned with is the eventual solution that Saadeh proposes on the social rather than political level. She refers to this as social association through five steps (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 124-126):

1– Opening up geographical areas and mixing populations.

2– Promoting the proliferation of social groups into many parties rather than the strict division of Christian and Muslim. This provides a greater leeway for intergroup association.

3– Profiting from the open economy to encourage business interactions between members of different social groups.

4– Dividing labour opportunities geographically to encourage the mobility of workers into different areas.

5– Encouraging intergroup friendships and relationships.

In the recent past, a number of organisations such as Youth for Tolerance, the Forum for Development Culture and Dialogue and UNESCO, have placed at least one of these steps high on their agendas.

It is important to note that integration is not the amalgamation of a society into one social group (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 124). On the contrary, it is the tolerance, interaction and cooperation of diversified social groups for pluralistic existence; to replace segregation, discrimination and hostility that may culminate in their extinction.

References:

Article 24, The Lebanese Constitution. (1926, ammended 1995).

Dar Annahar (2008) Description: The Social Structure of Lebanon [Internet] Available from <http://www.darannahar.com/category/1000280/product/319/>[Accessed 18 May 2009]

Doha agreement (2008).

Mashnouk, M. (2001) Interview in: The War of Lebanon, The Roots of Conflict. Episode 2. Directed by Omar Al-Issawi. Doha: Al Jazeera, 44min [Video: DVD]

Saadeh, S. A. (1992) The Social Structure of Lebanon: Democracy or Servitude? Beirut: Dar Annahar.

Salibi, K. (1977) The Modern History of Lebanon. New York: Caravan Books.

Traboulsi, F. (2007) A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto Press.

East Meets West: Images from Beirut 1975 & 1983

While I was reading through Chapter one of the book ‘Lebanon: A House Divided’ (a gift from a dear friend who understands my passion for this issue), I realised that every sentence I was absorbing was drawing a crystal clear image of multifaceted Beirut 1975 & 1983 (and less directly multifaceted Lebanese society). Although this book is in no way a history book, the image it portrayed in that first chapter is clearer than that attempted by many other historical books I have reviewed in the past. This is possibly because history books approach the subject of Lebanese conflict from an authoritative political perspective, while ‘Lebanon: A House Divided’ is a narrative focusing on the Lebanese social life through the eyes of residents, tourists, and soldiers:

One – Beirut: Paris of the East

It was early April 1975 in Beirut, the capital and epicenter of Lebanon. Around Martyr’s Square, the center of the city, traffic snarled into tight, noisy knots that crept through the streets at a frustrating pace. Hurried pedestrians heading toward unknown but purposeful destinations dodged and jockeyed for position on the congested sidewalks. Along the fashionable Rue Hamra, Western tourists off the cruise ships anchored in the harbor crowded the boutiques and bars while shrewd Lebanese entrepreneurs huddled in offices and coffeehouses, consummating lubrative deals with the world’s newly rich – the Arabs of the Arabian peninsula. Everywhere it seemed life was pulsating to Beirut’s own special tempo.

Martyrs Square before the Civil War

But beyond the bustle of the city, on the seaward-facing bluff that supported the neo-Arabesque buidlings of the American University, tranquility reigned. In all directions, the graceful panorama of Lebanon unfolded. A snow-capped mountain peak loomed in the distance like a mighty sentinel over the rugged coastal plain at its feet. On that plain, a series of low hills supporting colorful multistoried buildings dropped down to a white beach. Bisecting the beach was a ribbon of highway carrying cars north to Tripoli and south to Sidon. Far out from shore, a lone water-skier seemed to be smoothly pursuing the ghosts of the ancient Phoenicians across the Mediterranean. For someone gazing out on the turquoise sea reaching up to meet the limitless blue of the sky, the view created a feeling of boundless freedom, a perfect peace.

Martyrs Square during the Civil War

Eight Aprils later, on a similar pristine afternoon in 1983, black smoke billowed from ground-level fires roaring through the ruins of the American embassy on Bliss Street. At the entrance to the diplomatic compound, a Marine dressed in battle fatigues loosely grasped an M-16 in one hand and furiously directed rescue vehicles with the other. Inside, television crews lugging heavy equipment on their shoulders pointed their wide-angle lenses at a medical team loading an unconscious victim into a white van identified as an ambulance only by the red Arabic lettering on its side. The noise, the smell, the excitement were all centered on the six floors of the middle section of the three-wing embassy buidling, which had collapsed like a layer cake that had fallen on one side. Between two upper floors, a body, its head crushed by the buckling cement, hung out with arms dangling toward the ground. Below, red-bereted French soldiers of the Western powers’ Multi-National Peace Keeping Force picked through the rubble looking for more casualties. Just in front of them, a member of the Palestinian Red Crescent, the PLO-linked rescue squad, emerged from the wreckage carrying a clear plastic bag filled with human hands. With his grisly cargo, he passed a lone traffic light that, although its glass circles of red and green were blown away, somehow still flashed its commands to stop and go.

Mackey, S. (2006) Lebanon: A House Divided. W. W. Norton: New York, London. pp. 1-2.

Religious Solidarity and Opposition

The reason certain social groups in Lebanon today dislike one another goes back beyond the July War of 2006, the assassination demonstrations of 2005, the Civil War of 1975-1990, and the Independence of 1943. Who we like and support today is most likely not who we will like and support in the future, or who our parents, grandparents, and great grandparents liked and supported in the past.

Today in the 21st Century, political power is in the hands of the Sunnis, during the Independence years in the 20th Century it was in the hands of the Christian Maronites, during the Ottoman Empire (1516), it was in the hands of the Druze (who are a religious minority today), during the reign of the Fatimids of Egypt in the 10th Century, it was in the hands of the Shia.

Today, Sunnis and Druze go hand in hand, during the Ottoman Empire Druze and Sunnis had over 100 years of armed conflict, with the Shia supporting the Druze in the majority of the battles.

Today, Maronites are divided between government opposition and government alliance, during the Mameluk rule in the 14th Century, when Maronites were at their weakest, they enjoyed the strongest solidarity with one another.

Years and years of everchanging solidarities and oppositions have succeeded in accomplishing only one thing: more segregation.

I have begun mapping out the religious solidarity and opposition in Lebanon since the Ottoman Empire to the present. This is what it’s looking like until the end of the Maan rule, which historically, is only the first phase of our autonomous history. This mapping has yet to become more complex with the Melchites dividing into Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox, the Maronites dividing into two political convictions, the Druze dividing into Jumblat and Arsalan supporters, etc.

Our social groups are becoming more and more branched out every day, when what we all really aspire to, is that all these lines intersect into one line, one colour, labeled ‘Lebanese’.

Religious solidarity and opposition chronological mapping

Close-up

Note: The original mapping is very large, so not all the text is visible in this image. If you would like the full resolution mapping please leave a comment with your email address and I will email you a PDF version.

Little has Changed

Looking back at religious clashes before the Ottoman Empire, we realise that many of the areas in Lebanon still follow alliances that were formed hundreds of years ago by ethnic/tribal chiefs. According to Fawwaz Traboulsi in his book A History of Modern Lebanon, the country was divided before the Ottoman conquest between the following families (Traboulsi 5):

The Tanukhs and Arsalans – originally Yemeni tribes that were brought by the Umayyads to defend the Mediterranean shores against the Byzantine incursions – adopted the Druze faith and ruled the western approaches of Beirut.

The Assafs – Turkomen Sunnis – ruled Keserwan and Beirut.

The Sayfas – Kurdish Sunnis – ruled Tripoli and the North.

The Shihabs – Sunnis – ruled Wadi al-Taym.

The Harfushs – Shia – ruled Baalbeck and the Northern Biqaa.

The Maans – South Arabian warrior tribe that has been invited by the Tanukhs to settle in Baaqlin – adopted the Druze faith and ruled the Chouf region.

It is fascinating that today, more than 500 years later, the demographics of Lebanon still follow roughly these religious allegiances, and despite the fact that the edges of these regions have become more and more blurred with multi-religious interactions, Kamal Salibi’s writings in 1965 on inter-religious relations – in his book the Modern History of Lebanon – are still applicable today:

“Under the leadership of the Ma’an and Shihab emirs the Lebanese sects came to form what was in fact a confederacy. But actual contact between the various sects was almost entirely restricted to political and military co-operation. Socially, each religious community remained ignorant as well as independent of the others, and relations within the same village between neighbours of different sects rarely transcended casual or business acquaintance. Relationships between the various religious groups in Lebanon have developed considerably since the time of the Emirate. Nevertheless, religious divisions remain important.” (Salibi xiv)

With every war or political conflict, religious divisions in Lebanon become more and more evident. With so many years of being exposed to so many different political systems including both international interference and national autonomy, little has changed to the state of religious conflicts. If politics have not managed to socially bring religions together, then maybe it is time to start looking for a different medium.

The Religion of the Shehabi Family during the Ottoman Empire

In an attempt to understand the current conflict between Lebanese social groups, I decided to map out the religious and political rivalries and cooperations. I decided to go back to the early years when Mount Lebanon was first recognised as an autonomous province under the power of the Ottoman Empire, then on to the colonial years, independence, civil war, and up to the present situation.

Emir Beshir II Shehab

While going through a wide range of books and online articles that relay the history of Lebanon, I was surprised to find a reoccurring contradiction in many sources. During the Ottoman Empire, two families had authority over Mount Lebanon: The Lebanese Emirates of the Maanids (1516-1697) and the Shehabis (1697-1841). While all sources confirm that the Maanids were Druze, some of the sources depicted the Shehabis to be Sunnis which later converted to Maronite Catholicism, other sources said they were Druze same as the Maanids, while a few stated that Shehabis were Druze, but Emir Beshir II Shehab converted to a Maronite during his rule.

While considering these three possibilities, I would think that the first one is quite intriguing considering the religious demographics of Mount Lebanon during the 15th and 16th centuries. Mount Lebanon was dominated by Christians (Maronites) and Druze, with Sunni, Shia and Melchite minorities around the mountain’s edges. During the Maanids Emirate, the Druze were in power, but there was a strong Druze-Maronite cooperation, and Emir Fakhr Ed-Din al Maani developed Lebanon’s relationship with Latin-Catholic Europe through his close relationship with Tuscany (Italy). When the Maanids’ male line became extinct, power was passed on to the Shehabis.

Beiteddine, the home of Emir Beshir II Shehab

My question is, if the Shehabis were Sunni as some sources claim, and if the Druze were the majority and had the power, why would they pass the rule to a Sunni family if Sunnis were a minority with no strong inter-religious cooperation? Why was the power not passed to a Druze or a Maronite family? And finally, why would a simple fact such as an Emir’s religious origin remain ambiguously recorded after so many dedicated archives and writings about the history of the Ottoman Empire?

Reception Hall at Beiteddine (The House of Religion)