Lebanese Youth as Change-Makers

The term youth is very elusive and debatable. Some authors define it through biological markers bracketing it between the ages of puberty and parenthood (cited in Santrock, 1999, p.387), and others use specific cultural and social markers determining status (USaid, 2004). These are a few examples: For the United Kingdom Youth Parliament, youth comprise ages 11 to 18 (2010), for the United Nations General Assembly, it is 15 to 24 (2010), the Commonwealth Youth Programme, 15 to 29 (2010), and the Danish Youth Council, 15 to 34 (2010). This research defines youth through social markers depicting the minimum age as that of civic autonomy and independence, and the maximum as that of emotional, financial and social settlement. According to this definition, youth in Lebanon would belong to the age bracket of 18 to 30 years old. The autonomous age in Lebanon varies depending on religious sect, gender and civics, ranging from 14 to 21 years old, with 18 being the age of legal majority (Figure 1). On the other hand, the average age of marriage in Lebanon is 27.5 years for females and 31 years for males. This is based on Pan Arab Project for Child Development statistics in 1996 (cited in UNDP, 1998). For this reason, 30 years was chosen as the mean age across the two genders, before individuals settle into their social groups.

Despite the debatable age bracket of youth, a number of authors, governments and organisations agree that it is vital to include and engage youth in processes affecting their lifestyles, and that they play a crucial role in positively transforming conflict situations (Cited in Del Felice & Wisler, 2007, p.3). For example, the Home Office Community Cohesion strategy calls for establishing well resourced programmes that engage young people in decision-making processes affecting their communities (Cantle, 2001, p.30). Similarly, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs warns that the constant exclusion of youth in dialogue and social planning contributes to the disintegration and alienation of these stakeholders, and drives their shift towards negative behaviours (Confesor cited in UNDESA, 2005, p.19). Youth should be today, more than ever, at the forefront of social, economic and political developments (UN, 2010).

However, Celina Del Felice and Andria Wisler identified that the potential of youth as change-makers and peace-builders has unfortunately been unexplored to its full capacity by both policy-makers and academics (2007). Correspondingly, Dr. Kaouaci and the United Nations refer to youth as the ‘invisible’ stakeholders (cited in UNDESA, 2005, pp.34, 38). This is how Siobhan McEvoy-Levy phrases this idea:

Neither children nor youth appear as important variables in the literature on peace processes. Nor, authors of important UN reports admit, have adolescents been separately or well considered… A neglect of adolescents and older young people is short-sighted and counterproductive in terms of peace building (McEvoy-Levy, 2001, pp.2-3).

Del Felice and Wisler argue that youth are often seen as either victims or perpetrators, rather than participants in peace-building, and therefore decisions impacting their lives are made for them rather than with them (2007, pp.8-12). A number of case studies such as the International Youth Parliament, Rosario’s Youth Center, the United Network of Young Peacebuilders, and Otpor, demonstrate that youth have succeeded in positively transforming conflict and segregated societies.

Youth’s transformation capacity is supported by a number of reasons, collated by Del Felice and Wisler after extensive observations of case studies and examples. The reasons are that youth are more open to change, they are future-oriented as they have not witnessed the wars and memories of their parents and older generations, they are idealistic and innovative in solving old problems in imaginative ways, they are courageous risk-takers, and they are knowledgeable and experienced in issues relating to their peers (2007, pp.24-25).

These reasons are highly relevant to the case study of Lebanon, as social segregation is a problem dating back at least to the 1970s, with all generations over 30 having actively and physically witnessed or participated in the violent conflict. Their vivid memories of the war and its direct impact on their lives renders this group incapable of tackling the matured problem of social segregation. This leaves youth the healthier group to target and engage for innovative solutions towards integration. According to McEvoy, “youth are the primary actors in grassroots community development/relations work; they are the frontlines of peace building” (2001, p.25). On youth in Lebanon, the United Nations write that “youth must constitute an important focus of development policy”, and that they must be prepared for “full participation in the political, economic and social life of the country” (1998, ch.4, p.58).

Youth in Lebanon form more than one fifth of the country’s population, with a more or less even distribution across different districts in the country (UNDP, 1998, ch.4, p.58). Their rush to higher education means that 96% of both males and females are literate (UNDP, 1998, ch.6, p.76) and that their age at first marriage has now become higher than in most countries of the world (UNDP, 1998, ch.4, p.59). These demographic and social transformations render 18 to 30 year old Lebanese men and women a substantial and valuable asset to target, engage and collaborate with, to develop social integration interventions in Lebanon.

References:

Cantle, T. (2001) Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team. UK: Home Office.

Commonwealth Secretariat (2010) What is CYP? Commonwealth Youth Programme. [Internet] Available from: <http://www.thecommonwealth.org/Internal/152816/152828/what_is_cyp/> [Accessed 29 October 2010].

Danish Youth Council (2010) About DUF. [Internet] Available from: <http://duf.dk/home/about_duf/> [Accessed 29 October 2010].

Del Felice, C. & Wisler, A. (2007) The Unexplored Power and Potential of Youth as Peace-Builders. Peace Conflict & Development, vol. 11, November. [Internet] Available from: <http://www.peacestudiesjournal.org.uk> [Accessed 27 November 2008].

McEvoy-Levy, S. (2001) Youth as Social and Political Agents: Issues in Post Settlement Peace Building. Kroc Institute Occasional Paper, No. 21:OP:2, December. Research Initiative on the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict (RIREC).

The UN Refugee Agency (2007) Lebanon: Age of majority, particularly for females; paternal custody rights over female children. Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. [Internet] Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/469cd6b31c.html> [Accessed 14 November 2010].

The UN Refugee Agency (2010) Women’s Rights in the Middle East and North Africa 2010 – Lebanon. Freedom House. [Internet] Available from: <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b99012177.html> [Accessed 14 November 2010].

US Agency for International Development (USaid) (2004) Youth and Conflict: A Toolkit for Intervention. Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation. [Internet] Available from: <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_Youth_and_Conflict_Toolkit_April_2005.pdf> [Accessed 16 January 2011].

UK Youth Parliament (2010) About Us. [Internet] Available from: <http://www.ukyouthparliament.org.uk/4655/index.html> [Accessed 29 October 2010].

United Nations (2010) Youth and the United Nations. [Internet] Available from: <http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/mdgs.htm> [Accessed 29 October 2010].

United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2005) Final Report of the Expert Group Meeting on Dialogue in the Social Integration Process: Building peaceful social relations—by, for and with people. 21-23 November. New York: Division for Social Policy and Development.

United Nations Development Programme (1998) The Demography of Youth, ch. 4. [Internet] Available from: <www.undp.org.lb/programme/governance/advocacy/nhdr/…/chptr4.pdf> [Accessed 29 October 2010].

United Nations Development Programme (1998) Youth and Education, ch. 6. [Internet] Available from: <www.undp.org.lb/programme/governance/advocacy/nhdr/…/chptr6.pdf> [Accessed 16 January 2011].

Session at London Parliament: Cluster bombs, so far yet so near

I attended a session on cluster bombs, at The Houses of Parliament in London. The session brought together Member of Parliament Frank Cook, Thomas Nash from Cluster Munition Coalition, Brenda Heard from Friends of Lebanon, Lebanese victims of cluster bombs, ambassadors, sponsors, media representatives and other participants from social and political organisations.

The session aimed at raising awareness on the damaging impact of cluster bombs, and empowering participants to get involved in encouraging countries to sign and ratify The Convention on Cluster Munitions. So far 101 countries have signed (including the UK) and 23 have ratified. UK is expected to ratify the convention within the next few months. 7 more ratifications are needed until the convention is entered into force.

“The Convention on Cluster Munitions, CCM, prohibits all use, stockpiling, production and transfer of Cluster Munitions. Separate articles in the Convention concern assistance to victims, clearance of contaminated areas and destruction of stockpiles.” www.clusterconvention.org

The reason Lebanon was placed at the centre of this session was because it is one of the countries that has suffered the most from cluster bombs. During the July War in 2006, the number of cluster bombs dropped on Lebanon exceeded the population of the country. This is a simple indicator:

The session started with an introduction by Brenda Heard, then a screening of the documentary ’72 Hours’ about the cluster bombs that hit Lebanon from the 12th to the 14 of August 2006, and their ongoing impact on the lives of Lebanese in south Lebanon (if you would like to watch this documentary please express your interest in the comments). Then Hussein gave a testimony of losing his leg 20 months ago – on his 13th birthday – from a cluster bomb. Most of the cluster bombs hit farmlands and fields in South Lebanon, and according to Hussein, these fields are the only playgrounds that children in the south have. Over 80% of the injuries and deaths from cluster bombs affect children. A representative from Lebanon Mine Action Center explained during his presentation that the centre’s main action – aside from demining – was introducing behaviour change campaigns in the primary school curriculum, where children in the south are educated on how to recognise cluster bombs or areas marked with danger of cluster bombs, and to act upon any discoveries by not touching, and informing the right demining authorities. The facilitators responsible for delivering these awareness programmes are previous victims of cluster bombs. The session ended with Thomas Nash explaining the progress of the Convention on Cluster Munitions, and a final word by Member of Parliament Frank Cook inviting ambassadors and representatives to raise awareness on this serious matter and encourage governments in their countries to sign and ratify the convention.

At the end of the session, I felt deeply moved by the urgency of this matter, but more moved by the fact that this urgency has only been brought to my attention during a session at the Houses of Parliament in London. I was in Lebanon during the July War of 2006, and have been up to date with Lebanese news since then, but I have to admit that awareness around cluster bombs have been given mediocre attention by the media and politicians in Lebanon, compared to the awareness that I gained from attending this session. Of course Lebanese citizens in the south of Lebanon (predominantly Shia) are highly aware of this issue as it is an integral obstacle in their day to day lives. Aside from injuring and taking lives, it has stopped many farmers from farming their lands and grazing their cattle, and many children from enjoying the outdoors in their backyards and nearby fields.

In a country as small as Lebanon – where Beirut is only a 2-hour drive from the areas affected by cluster bombs – the reason behind this lack of awareness/empathy/sympathy from social groups who live in other parts of Lebanon can only be a result of a segregated society, and a segregated media.

Social Media: Overcoming the Barriers

I am in the middle of preparing for an important presentation about my research on Monday. Time is ticking and the presentation is nowhere near done yet, but I couldn’t resist the urge of sharing this video with you, and the idea that emerged from it.

The video below was produced by The Social Media Exchange; founded in Beirut in 2008 to help civil society and nonprofit organisations in Lebanon use media to advance their missions. The video presents case studies of organisations that have successfully used social media platforms such as facebook and blogs to connect and network with their target audiences.

It is highly noticeable that since the conception of platforms such as Facebook, Youtube, Twitter, blogging… there are so many development initiatives being implemented in Lebanon whether for political, social, cultural or creative objectives. This does not mean that these initiatives were non-existent or minimal in the past, but it may imply that Lebanon was not as connected – with the absence of social media – as it is now, for everyone to share these initiatives. As a result, it is undeniable that social media is overcoming the barriers for integration evident in the sectarian and regional social structure of Lebanon (you can read more about these barriers here). With social media, there are little barriers. An internet connection and the will to interact is all it takes.

I’d love to know about your experiences of how social media has helped you connect better with other people, projects and ideas, so please leave your comments!

…and here’s the video:

Social Group Dynamics in Lebanon

The following literature review defines the social structure in Lebanon, outlines barriers to social integration, and proposes solutions for overcoming these barriers; all in relation to youth members of social groups.

In describing social groups in Lebanon, this research makes frequent referencing to Safia Antoun Saadeh’s book ‘The Social Structure of Lebanon’ (Saadeh, 1992) . Dar Annahar, a prominent publishing house in Beirut, reviewed the book as a rare piece of work. Although numerous books have been written about Lebanon in the past decades, very few were those that ‘dealt specifically and comprehensively with the social composition of Lebanon from a structural point of view.’ (Dar Annahar, 2008).

A Nominal Social Structure

Peter Blau distinguished two types of parameters in a social structure, the nominal and the graduated. The former divides the population into impermeable groups with no possibility of overlaps such as gender, religion or race, while the latter divides society into groups that may alter over time such as age, income or power. The correlation of both the nominal and graduated parameter leads to the ordinal parameter that forms the hierarchies of a social structure. (Saadeh, 1992 pp.19).

In Lebanon, the division of social groups is based on the nominal parameter of religious affiliation (Saadeh, 1992 pp.20).  The social groups incorporate three religions: Islam (including Druze), Christianity and Judaism, divided into 18 sects and dispersed in mixed and uniform towns and cities across Lebanon. Saadeh refers to these social groups as castes, because of their characteristic similarities.

The nominal social structure is reflected in the division of power in the government according to a consociational democratic system. Article 24 of the Lebanese Constitution states that The Chamber of Deputies should be elected on a confessional basis along three criteria: Equal representation between religions, proportional representation between sects and proportional representation between different geographic regions.  The Doha agreement  for the 2009 elections equally represented two religious groups, Christians and Muslims, proportionally divided into 11 sects (each forming at least one political party) and distributed along 25 districts. The total is 128 deputees who are considered official representatives of their respective social groups.

Barriers to Social Integration

Throughout history, the conflict between social groups in Lebanon witnessed everchanging solidarities and oppositions, many of which resulted in civil wars, the last ending in 1990. Today, although the conflict is mainly non-violent, Lebanese social groups are still noticeably isolated (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 74). Kamal Salibi writes that actual contact between different social groups is almost entirely restricted to political co-operation (Salibi, 1977 pp. xiv).  Mohammed El Machnouk reiterates this by comparing the social structure to the Baalbeck pillars with only the top part – the government – holding the pillars – the social groups – together (Machnouk, 2001 min. 9:45).  Saadeh examines the links between social groups further, by expanding on five features of the post-civil war social structure that have erected or accentuated barriers to social integration (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 76) . The features are expanded on below, and discussed in relation to their effect on youth integration:

1– Socio-political rigidity: The most influential social group altered throughout historical episodes: Druzes during the Ottoman rule (1516-1918), Maronite Christians during and after the French Mandate (1926-1975) and Sunni Muslims following the 15-year Civil War (1995-present) (Salibi, 1977 & Traboulsi, 2007). Since the Independence in 1943, Article 95 of the Lebanese constitution gave social groups hierarchical supremacy in the government depending on the size of their communities. Thus, people became entrenched in their social groups and are continuously attempting to increase their numbers. This has created an ongoing competition among different social groups to advance in power at the expense of the others, thus breeding discrimination in youth on the basis of religious affiliation (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 76-79).

2– Segregation: The Civil War restructured an unofficial physical geographical segregation in such a way that every major social group now dominates at least one area: The Druze in the Shouf, the Shiites in the Bekaa and South Lebanon, the Sunnis in Tripoli and Sidon and parts of North Lebanon, and the Maronites in Metn, Keserwan and parts of North Lebanon. The population in the capital city Beirut is divided into Christians in East Beirut, Sunnis in most of West Beirut, and Shiites in South and some of West Beirut. Three decades of geographical segregation led to the growth of young individuals isolated from their counterparts in other social groups. They were brought up to, at best ignore, and at worse denigrate, the ‘other side’. This has led to fear, apprehension and distrust between young people of different social groups, thus deepening the lines of segregation (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 79-81).

3– Emphasis on differences rather than similarities: To set themselves apart as an identifiable community, each social group adopted a peculiar lifestyle through fashion, values, language and dialect. Elements of the Lebanese cultural identify were very homogeneous, so social groups looked outside Lebanon for cultural identities of nations they paralleled their religious beliefs to. Thus Sunnis associated with Saudi Arabia, Shiites with Iran, and Christians with the West. As a result, youth groups acquired in their upbringing, skills that allowed them to identify and judge members of other social groups by their physical appearance, their dialects or their interests (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 81-84).

4– Social institutions: A number of these furthered the continuation of disparate social groups.

First is the Judiciary System, divided into state laws (such as voting and business laws) that are set and controlled by the government, and exclusive personal status laws (such as marriage and inheritance) for each sect. Every social group must adhere to the personal status laws placed by the religious agency that represents it. Therefore, Bkirki, supported by the Maronite Council, is the reference point for Maronite laws, Majlis al-Millah for Greek Orthodox, Dar al-Ifta for Sunni, Al Majlis al-Shii al-Aala for Shia, and Shaykh al-Aql for Druze. The absence of a common civil law for all has increased inequality and division among social groups. A simple example is family members of different religions being unable to inherit from one another because different personal status laws would apply for each religion (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 85-88).

The second institution is marriage. It is closely regulated because it can jeapordise the very existence of social groups if inter-community marriages and births are not supervised. On religious grounds, a Muslim woman is prohibited from marrying into another religious group, but a Christian woman is not. Furthermore, children follow the religious sect of their fathers. These two factors resulted in an increase in Muslims and decrease in Christians, giving the latter group an incentive to promote social controls and pressures that deter youth groups from marrying into other social groups, and encourage endogamy (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 88-89). From 1952 to the present, the Lawyer’s syndicate has requested numerously that civil marriage be initiated, but religious agencies have refused continuously. (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 86).

The third institution that limits social integration is the educational system, which is separated into the private and public sectors. Before the civil war, the government that ran the public sector encouraged the mingling of students and staff of different social groups within the same institution, but from as ealry as 1976, public institutions started quickly dividing into branches representing the religious affiliation of the local area. In addition, the public sector is notorious for its lack of organization and low standards, and this has driven many parents who can afford it, to resort to the private sector for the education if their children. Religious institutions mainly run this sector, and open their doors to students within the same affiliation with minor exceptions. In these private institutions, the content and cultural aspects of the teachings are driven along religious ideologies (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 90-91). As a consequence, both the public and private educational sectors today offer very limited opportunities in schools and universities for youth of different social groups to study in a diverse environment.

5– Social mobility: In general terms, this refers to the movement of individuals from one social group to another. If this movement occurs at the same level, it contributes largely to social integration. However, in Lebanon, it is only possible on an upward or downward level according to two strict conditions: The first is the upper or lower movement of the social group as a whole, and the second is the upper or lower movement of the individual within his/her own social group. Attempts that met the first condition in the past led to two civil wars, in 1958 and 1975, both guided by the Sunnis as they tried to move upwards towards the Maronite group. Attempts that met the second condition led to further segregation between members of the same social groups as they tried to unseat the feudal families and overtake supremacy of the social group. The most violent of these attempts was the devastating war in 1989 between Michel Aoun’s army and the Lebanese Forces. The consequence was a division that is still existent today in the Maronite social group. Safia Saadeh states that ambitious youths who seek to further their status beyond the social mobility restrictions in Lebanon find immigration as the only outlet (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 91-94).

A Solution to Social Segregation

In her concluding chapter, Saadeh contemplates different solutions for integrating divided social groups. She discusses a number of different alternatives in the political system; from maintaining consociational democracy to shifting towards complete democracy, fundamentalism or secularism. She dissects every system and controverts it offering reasons as to why it wouldn’t solve the problem (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 117-124). These arguments will not be covered here because the subject of this research is not aiming to alter the political system.  However, what this research is concerned with is the eventual solution that Saadeh proposes on the social rather than political level. She refers to this as social association through five steps (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 124-126):

1– Opening up geographical areas and mixing populations.

2– Promoting the proliferation of social groups into many parties rather than the strict division of Christian and Muslim. This provides a greater leeway for intergroup association.

3– Profiting from the open economy to encourage business interactions between members of different social groups.

4– Dividing labour opportunities geographically to encourage the mobility of workers into different areas.

5– Encouraging intergroup friendships and relationships.

In the recent past, a number of organisations such as Youth for Tolerance, the Forum for Development Culture and Dialogue and UNESCO, have placed at least one of these steps high on their agendas.

It is important to note that integration is not the amalgamation of a society into one social group (Saadeh, 1992 pp. 124). On the contrary, it is the tolerance, interaction and cooperation of diversified social groups for pluralistic existence; to replace segregation, discrimination and hostility that may culminate in their extinction.

References:

Article 24, The Lebanese Constitution. (1926, ammended 1995).

Dar Annahar (2008) Description: The Social Structure of Lebanon [Internet] Available from <http://www.darannahar.com/category/1000280/product/319/>[Accessed 18 May 2009]

Doha agreement (2008).

Mashnouk, M. (2001) Interview in: The War of Lebanon, The Roots of Conflict. Episode 2. Directed by Omar Al-Issawi. Doha: Al Jazeera, 44min [Video: DVD]

Saadeh, S. A. (1992) The Social Structure of Lebanon: Democracy or Servitude? Beirut: Dar Annahar.

Salibi, K. (1977) The Modern History of Lebanon. New York: Caravan Books.

Traboulsi, F. (2007) A History of Modern Lebanon. London: Pluto Press.

Tolerance for Dummies

One of the key terms of my PhD research is ‘social integration’. In the 1995 World Summit for Social Development, the United Nations listed 3 agenda headings as a priority for action, one of which was ‘enhancing social integration’ – alongside ‘decreasing poverty’ and ‘reducing unemployment’.

The United Nations defines social integration in relation to 2 approaches:

1) Social integration as an inclusionary goal: for greater justice and equality of life particularly targeted towards minority groups and deprived communities

2) Social integration as heightened solidarity and mutual identification: for promoting tolerance and harmonious interaction at all levels of society to decrease the likelihood of violence

A few months ago, I was fortunate enough to meet Elie Awad, the founder of Lebanese NGO Youth for Tolerance. This NGO is concerned with both approaches to social integration. Their statement reads:

“We at Youth for Tolerance, or Y4T in short, work to promote a culture of tolerance that will result in respect, acceptance and appreciation of religious and political diversity in Lebanon, as well as in a better inclusion of all socially marginalized groups.”

Youth for Tolerance, as their name suggests, focus on the stage of tolerance. They break down the social integration process into small steps:

1) Noticing differences

2) Finding differences amusing

3) Finding differences enriching

4) Seeing beyond differences

One of their many interventions to achieve this is a small simple booklet: ‘Tolerance for Dummies’, a guide for young Lebanese to achieve tolerance.

Although it is rigorous and highly grounded in conflict management theories, it is written in an easily accessible, engaging and entertaining voice. It contains tips, anecdotes, warnings, fun exercises and lots of humour for ‘achieving tolerance nirvana’ as the subtitle states. To make the reader’s experience even more interesting, it asks him/her to flip the book over if they disagree with any of the tolerance statements. What’s on the back? ‘Civil War for Dummies’! So the second half of the book is a detailed simple process, again with lots of humour and interactivity, couterarguing tolerance and explaining how simple anti-tolerant steps can quickly instigate the other extreme: A civil war.

Front and back covers

I highly recommend reading this booklet. It demonstrates how the typical everyday behaviour of every single young Lebanese can inflict a snowballing effect on Lebanese integration or segregation. ‘The whole is the sum of the parts’.

If you would like a PDF copy of the booklet please leave your email address in the comments, or get in touch with Elie Awad at info@youthfortolerance.org.